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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In his controversial essay, The End of Marriage in Scandinavia, 
anthropologist Stanley Kurtz asks, “Will same-sex marriage undermine 
the institution of marriage?”  He answers, “It already has.”1  Examining 
 * Allan Carlson is President of The Howard Center for Family, Religion & 
Society in Rockford, Illinois.  He holds his Ph.D. in Modern European History from 
Ohio University.  His books include THE SWEDISH EXPERIMENT IN FAMILY POLITICS: THE 
MYRDALS AND THE INTERWAR POPULATION CRISIS (1990); THE “AMERICAN WAY”: 
FAMILY AND COMMUNITY IN THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN IDENTITY (2003); and 
CONJUGAL AMERICA: ON THE PUBLIC PURPOSES OF MARRIAGE (2007).  This paper was 
initially presented for the conference “Marriage Debates” held at UCLA School of Law, 
April 21-22, 2006. 
 1. Stanley Kurtz, The End of Marriage in Scandinavia: The ‘Conservative Case’ 
for Same-Sex Marriage Collapses, WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 2, 2004, at 26. 




data from Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, Kurtz concludes that 
“[m]arriage in Scandinavia is in deep decline . . . [a]nd the mainspring of 
the decline—an increasingly sharp separation between marriage and 
parenthood—can be linked to gay marriage.”2  He adds that this linkage 
belies the “conservative” argument that allowing same-sex marriage 
would restore respect and enthusiasm for traditional matrimony.3 
Critics of the essay have pointed to the weakness of its statistical 
analysis.  They have noted, for example, that Sweden’s formal recognition 
of “registered partnerships” in 1994 occurred after the rate of unmarried 
cohabitation increased, and that seventy percent of Swedish cohabitants 
do marry after their first child is born.4 
A deeper problem with Kurtz’s argument, however, is its limited 
historical context.  In fact, the deliberate deconstruction of marriage in 
Sweden began over seventy-five years ago.  It was, and remains, part of 
an ideological project to socialize broad aspects of economic life through 
a profound transformation of the family and home.  Prior to the 1930s, 
Sweden’s Social Democrats, like other European socialist parties, had 
focused their political energies on conflicts in the factories between 
workers and capitalists.  The new ideological tactic, launched in the 
early 1930s, sought, in historian Yvonne Hirdman’s words, “to smuggle 
socialist forms into the capitalist society until they finally brought down 
the entire economic system from the inside.”5  Looking at the same 
developments, legal scholar Jacob W. F. Sundberg sees the “Socialist 
government in Sweden set[ting] itself a goal perfectly analogous to that 
which loomed for the [Russian] Bolsheviks [in the 1920s]: carry 
socialism to its logical conclusion in the field of family law.”6 
In short, the deliberate political elimination of marriage as a 
meaningful legal and social institution was far advanced in Sweden 
before same-sex marriage even became an issue.  Ironically, this project 
actually began as part of a campaign to raise the Swedish birthrate. 
 2. Id. at 27. 
 3. Id. (“[The analysis] that supposedly helps validate the ‘conservative case’ for 
gay marriage—i.e., that it will encourage stable marriage for heterosexuals and 
homosexuals alike—does no such thing.”). 
 4. See, e.g., M.V. Lee Badgett, Prenuptial Jitters: Did Gay Marriage Destroy 
Heterosexual Marriage in Scandinavia?, SLATE, May 20, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/ 
2100884/. 
 5. Yvonne Hirdman, Utopia in the Home, 22 INT’L J. POL. ECON. 5, 29 (1992). 
 6. Jacob W.F. Sundberg, Recent Changes in Swedish Family Law: Experiment 
Repeated, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 34, 42 (1975). 
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II.  CRISIS IN THE POPULATION QUESTION 
The turn of Swedish Social Democracy toward a scientifically guided 
re-engineering of marriage, family, and home had roots in the late 1920s.  
A circle of young intellectuals formed in Stockholm, committed to 
radical change.  It included economists Erik Lindahl, Ingvar Svennilson, 
Pierre Guinchard, and Alf Johansson, and architects Sven Wallander, 
Gregor Paulson, Sven Markelius, and Uno Åhren.  Relative to marriage 
and family, the key figures were economist Gunnar Myrdal and his wife, 
Alva, who at that time was a student of literature.  She described this 
circle as embracing “young radical people who want to be free to 
criticize anything—they don’t care about their careers . . . .  I simply love 
these people.  Especially our architect friends . . . .  They form in Sweden 
the avant garde of constructive social radicalism.”7 
An early product of their collaboration was the Stockholm Exposition 
of 1930, where the architects and designers demanded a profound break 
with the past.  Europe was evolving into a vast and complex urban-
industrial organism, they argued.  The ideals and social structures of 
Sweden’s rural and village heritage would have to give way to a new 
order, one consciously engineered.  In their overturning of inherited 
structures, they would be radical.  In their attachment to science, they 
would be rational.  And in their embrace of “free, independent, living 
art,” they would craft a new aesthetic.  All would be in service of social 
revolution.  Their manifesto, Acceptera, concluded: “accept the aforementioned 
reality!  Only through that do we have the chance to govern, to have the 
power to change things and shape a culture which is a flexible 
instrument for life.”8 
This new order, moreover, required “a higher type of human being,” 
toward the molding of which public policy would have to turn.  They 
believed that home design and furnishings were critical to forming this 
new human type.  Alva Myrdal adopted their style of social engineering 
 7. Hirdman, supra note 5, at 30 (quoting Letter from Alva Myrdal to Eva and 
Arthur Burns (Dec. 1932), in ALVA MYRDALS ARKIV BREVSAMLING [Letter Collection], 
Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv [Labor Movement Archive]).  On the origins of Swedish 
marriage and family policy, see ALLAN CARLSON, THE SWEDISH EXPERIMENT IN FAMILY 
POLITICS: THE MYRDALS AND THE INTERWAR POPULATION CRISIS 35-70 (1990).  See also 
ANN-KATRIN HATJE, BEFOLKNINGSFRÅGAN OCH VÄLFÄRDEN: DEBATTEN OM FAMILJEPOLITIK 
OCH NATIVITETSÖKNING UNDER 1930-OCH 1940-TALEN 15-26 (1974). 
 8. See GUNNAR ASPLUND, ET AL., ACCEPTERA 186, 188, 198 (1931). 




and, working with architect Sven Markelius, designed and saw through 
construction a Collective House in Stockholm.  It involved a dramatic 
restructuring of the family.  Industrialization, she reasoned, had already 
stripped marriage and the private home of most productive functions.  
Housework, child care, and consumption would now be transferred from 
the home to the collective as well.  Myrdal’s House featured small 
apartments largely composed of sleeping rooms and closets, complemented 
by a collective kitchen and dining room, a collective nursery for infants 
and twenty-four-hour care center for toddlers, and a central laundry, 
library, community room, and telephone center.  Private family life, 
Alva Myrdal concluded, must be socialized in this manner for the good 
of all.9 
In 1934, she co-authored with husband Gunnar the debate book Kris I 
Befolkningsfrågan (“Crisis in the Population Question”).  The book turned 
conventional Swedish politics upside down.  In Kris I Befolkningsfrågan, 
the Myrdals built the case for a socialist pro-natalism.  All healthy 
couples, they argued, should want and bear at least four children so that 
the nation might survive.  They dismissed conservative laments about 
declining morals, arguing that young people were simply responding to 
the new incentives found in a capitalist society.  Children, once 
economic assets, had now become economic liabilities, the chief cause 
of poverty.  Only a massive restructuring of family and state could 
restore harmony.10 
Their positive program wove together feminist and socialist goals.  
Regarding the former, the Myrdals dismissed the full-time homemaker 
as a relic from the past.  Employed mothers were now a “social fact,” a 
rational trend beyond challenge or debate.  Working women had the 
“right” to retain their jobs and income while bearing children, which 
public policy must ensure.  While careful to endorse the continued utility 
of marriage, the Myrdals also insisted that births out of wedlock be 
treated as equal to those within marriage, particularly in regard to 
benefits.  In place of dependency on fathers or husbands, all mothers 
would be dependent on the state. 
This required socializing all costs of bearing and rearing children 
through universal child benefits.  The Myrdals argued that the state 
should provide prenatal and maternity care and child health and dental 
services without cost.  Public daycare should also be provided free of 
cost, along with clothing allowances, breakfasts and lunches at school, 
 9. Hirdman, supra note 5, at 36, 39; see also Alva Myrdal, Kollektiv Bostadsform, 24 
TIDEN 604 (1932); Alva Myrdal, Kollektivhus, HERTHA 9-16 (1933). 
 10. See ALVA & GUNNAR MYRDAL, KRIS I BEFOLKNINGSFRÅGAN 52, 98, 118-25, 
151-70 (1934); see also CARLSON, supra note 7, at 81-88. 
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summer camps, and all levels of education.  In addition, the government 
would deliver subsidized housing, specifically designed and constructed 
to accommodate working mothers and children.  Taken together, these 
benefits amounted to a broad socialization of consumption.  To pay for 
these benefits, tax reforms would redistribute income horizontally between 
the “child poor” and the “child rich,” and vertically between socioeconomic 
classes.11  This project also required a “full employment” policy guaranteeing 
jobs for all men and women and state economic planning to ensure 
stabilized production levels for socialized consumption. 
Taken together, this combination of feminist and socialist goals would 
mean the movement of all Swedish women out of their homes, an end to 
the “male breadwinner” and “homemaker” roles, and the new employment 
of mothers in the collectivized tasks of child care, early education, meal 
preparation, and cleaning.  As the Myrdals summarized, “the population 
question is so transformed into the most effective argument for a 
thorough and radical socialist remodeling of society.”  It meant that “social 
relations in our land” must “be altered” so that citizens would willingly 
bring enough children into the world to renew the nation.12  This also 
meant shaping a new “ideal” family: 
In the new family, . . . the [former] housewife will stand as a comrade alongside 
her husband in productive labor.  During the working hours, the seven or eight 
hours in the middle of the day, the family shall be divided so as to adapt to 
industrial society’s broader division of labor: working adults must be at their 
jobs; the children must play, eat, sleep, and attend school.  Common housing, 
shared free time, together with that elusive, subtle, personal relationship that is, 
we maintain, a key element of the family, will remain.  However, maintaining a 
private household, individualistic parental authority, and the housewife’s 
sheltered life will not remain.  These must be removed from the picture as the 
family’s adaptation to modern life requires.13 
Relative to marriage, these ideologically-driven changes would mark a 
curious diminution in status and function.  On the one hand, the Myrdals 
still praised marriage as the most likely source of larger families, called 
for marriage at earlier ages, and even recommended that the state introduce 
low interest marriage loans.  On the other hand, their program would 
strip marriage of virtually all remaining functions, except procreation.  
 11. See CARLSON, supra note 7, at 88. 
 12. MYRDAL & MYRDAL, supra note 10, at 285, 117; see also IVAR IVERUS, VERSUCH 
EINER DARSTELLUNG, DER ZUSAMMENHANGES ZWISCHEN BEVÖLKERUNGS ENTWICKLUNG, 
FAMILIENPOLITIK UND ÖEFFENTLICHEN MEINUNG IN SCHWEDEN 35, 90-91 (1953). 
 13. MYRDAL & MYRDAL, supra note 10, at 319 (emphasis added). 




An end to the roles of “breadwinner” and “homemaker” would mean the 
demise of complementarity and an end to a distinctive division of labor 
within the home.  The socialization of everything from infant care to 
meal preparation further left the home as an empty economic shell.  
Finally, where marriage had once meant the dependency of husband on 
wife, wife on husband, and children on parents, the new scheme would 
instead make all adults and all children dependents of the state.14 
III.  FROM IDEAS TO POLICY 
In response to the Myrdals’ book, the Social Democratic government 
created the Royal Population Commission of 1935.  Gunnar Myrdal—
now also a member of the Swedish Senate—emerged as its leading 
member, with Alva Myrdal as a frequent consultant.  The Commission 
produced seventeen major reports, including investigations and 
recommendations on taxation, maternity allowances, sterilization, 
contraception, abortion, nutrition, clothing, the legal status of working 
women, “depopulation” of the countryside, the family and socialism, 
daycare, summer camps, and demography.  All but the Slutbetänkande 
(“Final Report”) were either drafted or closely controlled by Gunnar 
Myrdal. 
The Commission’s central ideological statement was the Betänkande i 
Sexualfrågan (“Report on the Sexual Question”), released in 1936.  
Gunnar Myrdal claimed almost exclusive authorship.15  The “sex report” 
actually represented an abridged, updated, reorganized, and more 
politically sensitive version of Kris i befolkningsfrågan.  It argued that 
fertility decline was due to the rationalization of sex life among the 
Swedes, facilitated by contraception.  Under a capitalist industrial order, 
children had become the chief cause of poverty.  Only a new program 
combining social reform, income redistribution, and full sexual 
enlightenment could restore a birthrate ensuring the Swedish people’s 
survival.16 
Relative to marriage, the sex report had two messages.  On the 
surface, it affirmed that maximizing the married portion of the adult 
population was in society’s best interests.  Since “serious” social and 
 14. See ANN-SOFIE KÄLVEMARK, MORE CHILDREN OF BETTER QUALITY?: ASPECTS 
OF SWEDISH POPULATION POLICY IN THE 1930’S (1980); Ann-Katrin Hatje, Political and 
Gender Perspectives on Alva Myrdal’s Social Engineering.  The Example of Pedagogic 
Childcare in the 1930’s and 1940’s (2002) (unpublished paper). 
 15. See CARLSON, supra note 7, at 40; Hirdman, supra note 5, at 51, 140. 
 16. See ALVA MYRDAL, NATION AND FAMILY 117-18 (2d ed. 1965); see also 
BETÄNKADE I SEXUALFRÅGAN 15-29; CARLSON, supra note 7, at 140-45; STATENS 
OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGEN 1936: 59 [hereinafter SOU 1936: 59]; Hirdman, supra note 5, 
at 52. 
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psychological problems were associated with late marriage, the report 
also urged that Sweden work to reduce the average age of marriage by 
several years.17 
At a deeper level, though, the sex report embraced changes that would 
sever the historic relation of marriage to sexuality and procreation.  To 
begin with, the Population Commission sought to “rehabilitate morally” 
premarital and extramarital sexuality.  Specifically: 
Nowadays when two young people fall in love and cannot marry for economic 
reasons, in most cases this does not interfere with entering into sex relations 
with each other.  These premarital relations entered into between socially equal 
individuals cannot be summarily condemned for ethical reasons, according to 
the opinion of the Commission.18 
Moreover, the Population Commission fully embraced contraception and 
urged repeal of existing laws prohibiting the sale and distribution of 
birth control devices.  It recommended the use of the pessary and the 
condom as the most satisfying and effective techniques, and called as 
well for extensive sex education among children and youth.  The 
Commission specifically blessed contraception within marriage: 
[T]he Population Commission has reached the opinion that birth control 
practiced from a sense of responsibility is of positive value by making it 
possible for young people who . . . have reached the age of responsibility for 
their actions to marry and not bear children until such a time in the future as 
they can do so without too great economic risk.  If we want to develop earlier 
marriage among the country’s mature young people, the Commission holds that 
it is of the utmost importance that full knowledge of safe and harmless 
contraceptive methods be made available to them . . . .19 
The Population Commission claimed that only this embrace of sexual 
enlightenment and toleration for extramarital sexuality could build “a 
new foundation” for a positive solution to the birth-rate crisis.  More 
fundamentally, as enacted in 1938, these changes effectively severed the 
historic legal bonds between marriage and sexuality and between 
marriage and procreation as well, marking a turning point in Swedish 
marital law. 
 17. See MYRDAL, supra note 16, at 35, 161; SOU 1936: 59, 70-82. 
 18. MYRDAL, supra note 16, at 194-95 (quoting Report on the Sexual Question, 
SOU 1936: 59). 
 19. Id. at 195 (quoting Report on the Sexual Question, SOU 1936: 59). 




IV.  ERA OF THE SOCIALIST HOUSEWIFE 
The next twenty-five years witnessed a reaction to this sexual and 
social radicalism.  While Sweden remained neutral during World War II, 
the country was on a war footing between 1939 and 1945, and a 
nationalist pathos spread over public life.20  Within Sweden’s Social 
Democratic movement, a different form of women’s politics came to the 
fore.  Alva Myrdal’s combination of equity feminist goals and socialist 
means gave way to the era of the socialist housewife.  Centered in the 
Women’s Council of Sweden’s labor unions (the “LO”) and in the 
Social Democratic Party’s Women’s League, the housewives interpreted 
women’s liberation to mean freedom from toil in the factories.  Progress 
for them meant gaining sufficient family income to allow the wives and 
mothers of the working class to rear their own children at home.  They 
celebrated maternity as the highest of callings and the good home as the 
heart of the working class family.21  The reaction was so intense that 
even Alva Myrdal co-authored a book that gave some positive attention 
to the full-time mother and homemaker.22 
Policy shifted in a conservative direction as well.  In 1938, the LO and 
the Swedish Federation of Employers reached their historic Saltsjöbaden 
agreement on wages.  It quietly embraced the concept of the “family 
wage” for fathers, one that would sustain a full-time mother in the home.  
Working mothers were discouraged.  In 1947 and 1948, Sweden’s 
Parliament rejected the Myrdals’ call for “in kind” family benefits.  Instead, 
the Social Democratic government created “child allowances” that 
provided a direct cash benefit to all families with dependent children.  
Swedish school girls took mandatory classes in home economics and 
child care.  “Sex education” texts in the schools praised marriage as the 
only legitimate setting for fulfilling sexuality.  Fertility rose to near an 
average of three children per family.  As late as 1965, only three percent 
of all Swedish preschool children were in nonmaternal day care.23 
 20. See HATJE, supra note 7, at 47-58. 
 21. See YVONNE HIRDMAN, DEN SOCIALISTISKA HEMMAFRUN (1992); Hirdman, 
supra note 5, at 21-25; Ylva Waldemarson, Att föra kvinnors talan.  LO:s kvinnoråd 
1947-67, in KVINNOR MOT KVINNOR 75, 75-105 (Christina Florin et al. eds., 1999). 
 22. ALVA MYRDAL & VIOLA KLEIN, WOMEN’S TWO ROLES: HOME AND WORK (2d 
ed. 1968); see also Gro Hagemann, The Housewife Dilemma: Women’s Two Roles 
Revisited, at 3 (Mar. 6, 2002), http://www.pcr.uu.se/conferenses/myrdal/pdf/gro_hageman.pdf. 
 23. See YVONNE HIRDMAN, MED KLUVEN TUNGA (1998); see also Hirdman, supra 
note 5, at 97. 
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V.  “RED SWEDEN” 
However, the late 1960s experienced new waves of radicalism.  So-
called Eurocommunism was on the march, while Red Brigades terrorized 
Italy and West Germany, and France was torn apart by the New Left 
riots.  Meanwhile, Christian values—summarized by one analyst as 
“responsibility, sacrifice, altruism, and the sanctity of long-term 
commitments [such as marriage]”—gave way rapidly across Western 
Europe to a “secular individualism” focused on the desires of the self.24 
Sweden also entered into what feminist historian Yvonne Hirdman 
calls its “[R]ed [Y]ears,” 1967-1976.25  At their heart was a massive 
“gender turn” that would further alter the nature of marriage in 
Sweden.26  In 1968, a joint report by the Social Democratic Party and the 
LO abandoned the “family wage” ideal and concluded that “there are . . . 
strong reasons for making the two-breadwinner family the norm in 
planning long-term changes within the social insurance system.”27  The 
next year, Alva Myrdal chaired a major panel, “On Equality,” for the 
Social Democrats.  Its report concluded that “[i]n the society of the 
future . . . the point of departure must be that every adult is responsible 
for his/her own support.  Benefits previously inherent in married status 
should be eliminated or transferred to children”28  The Myrdal Report 
insisted that true “natural” differences between women and men should 
pose no barrier to reform; state action should make such innate 
distinctions insignificant.29  The Report also called for a tax policy based 
on individual earnings, without preference for any “form of cohabitation,” 
Myrdal’s new and deflating term for marriage.30 
 24. Ron Lesthaeghe, A Century of Demographic and Cultural Change in Western 
Europe: An Exploration of Underlying Dimensions, 9 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 411, 
429-30 (1983). 
 25. Yvonne Hirdman, The Importance of Gender in the Swedish Labor Movement: 
Or: A Swedish Dilemma, at 9 (2002) (unpublished paper, Stockholm University and 
Swedish National Institute of Working Life). 
 26. The last spirited defense of the socialist housewife appeared in 1964.  NANCY 
ERIKSSON, BARA EN HEMMAFRU (1964). 
 27. Jane Lewis & Gertrude Åström, Equality, Difference, and State Welfare: 
Labor Market and Family Policies in Sweden, 18 FEMINIST STUD. 59, 67 (1992). 
 28. THE WORKING GROUP ON EQUALITY, TOWARDS EQUALITY: THE ALVA MYRDAL 
REPORT 82 (1971). 
 29. See id. at 17, 64, 82-84. 
 30. Id. at 38. 




Accordingly, in 1969, the Swedish government resolved to fundamentally 
reform its marriage law.31  The Minister of Justice created a Committee 
of Experts and issued his Directives.  The Committee was to consider 
whether there was still even a need for marriage law, and if so, how it 
should be reconfigured.  A key principle would be neutrality toward 
living arrangements.  Specifically, the Minister urged that the difference 
between “marriage” and “non-marriage” be sharply reduced: 
In my opinion, a new legislation ought as far as possible to be neutral in relation 
to the different forms of living together and different moral views.  Marriage 
has and ought to have a central position in the family law, but one should try to 
see that the family law legislation does not contain any provisions which create 
unnecessary hardships or inconveniences for those who have children and build 
families without marrying . . . .  Provisions concerning married individuals 
should generally be given such form that the spouse can retain a large measure 
of independence during marriage.32 
The Committee was to consider the diminished importance of marital 
status in Sweden, the new imperative of “personal fulfillment,” the rising 
demand for divorce, declining public interest in material property in 
favor of pensions, annuities, and other claims on the welfare state, and 
the elevation of gender equality into the cornerstone of Swedish social 
policy.33 
In this spirit, Sweden’s Parliament approved in 1971 a fundamental 
reform of the income tax.  It abolished the taxation of households 
through the joint income tax return premised on “income splitting” by 
married couples.  This system had favored the one-income household 
 31. The basis of modern Swedish family law was The Marriage Code of 1920, 
essentially unchanged through the 1960s.  It built on the idea of the marital home as an 
economic partnership, with husband and wife equal in rights but different in function.  
Relative to property, the 1920 Code adopted the concept of “deferred community.”  The 
prescribed marital property system rested on the idea of “separate administration but 
equal division for one and all.”  The measure abolished the automatic co-ownership of 
property during marriage as well as the position of the husband as the dominant 
administrator.  Rather, each spouse would control and administer the property that he or 
she owned at the time of marriage.  The Code expanded the definition of marital property 
to include property acquired by inheritance during marriage.  On the dissolution of the 
marriage through death or divorce or by mutual petition, all marital property would be 
divided equally, although in cases of divorce the courts retained the power to punish one 
or the other spouse for marital misconduct.  Divorce required a finding of fault.  
Importantly, the Code laid upon the husband a special responsibility for economic 
support of his wife and children.  Overall, the 1920 Code aimed at creating a relatively 
simply property system that minimized disputes and lawyering and encouraged gender 
specialization in the home.  It was ideally suited to a people committed to nearly 
universal marriage and the avoidance of divorce.  See D. Bradley, Marriage, Family, 
Property and Inheritance in Swedish Law, 39 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 370, 373-78 (1990). 
 32. Sundberg, supra note 6, at 41 (ellipsis in original). 
 33. See Bradley, supra note 31, at 378-80; Feriborz Nozari, The 1987 Swedish 
Family Law Reform, 17 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 219, 219-20 (1989). 
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with a mother at home.  More fundamentally, it had treated the family as 
an economic and legal unit, with its own rights and claims.34  Under the 
tax reform, all persons would henceforth be taxed as individuals, without 
attention to marital status, dependents, employment, or income of a 
spouse.  This gave Sweden the most “fully individualized taxation system” 
in the developed world.  In the context of high marginal tax rates, this 
change also greatly benefited the two-income household and penalized 
the one-income breadwinner family.35  In addition, it ended recognition 
of the married-couple family as a special economic entity.  Analysts of 
modern Sweden are nearly unanimous in viewing this shift from joint to 
individual taxation as the most sweeping social change in Sweden over 
the last forty years, for it “more or less eradicated” the traditional 
home.36  As the feminist analyst Annika Baude concludes: “If I were to 
choose one reform which has perhaps done the most to promote equality 
between the sexes, I would point to the introduction of individual 
income taxation.”37 
On the basis of the Family Law Reform Committee’s work, Parliament 
approved two years later, in 1973, a new measure governing marriage 
and divorce.  Although access to marriage expanded, the distinctive or 
special nature of marriage receded.  Most existing legal impediments to 
heterosexual marriage disappeared; even half-brothers and half-sisters 
could now marry, as could aunts and nephews, uncles and nieces.38  
Only full siblings and persons related by blood in unilinear descent faced 
prohibition; bigamy and polygamy remained banned.39  The minimum 
marriage age for both spouses became eighteen.40 
 34. Maud L. Eduards, Toward a Third Way: Women’s Politics and Welfare 
Policies in Sweden, 58 SOC. RES. 677, 681-82 (1991); Anne Lise Ellingsæter, Dual 
Breadwinner Societies: Provider Models in the Scandinavian Welfare States, 41 ACTA 
SOCIOLOGICA 59, 62 (1998); Christina Florin, Skatten Som Befriar, in KVINNOR MOT 
KVINNOR, supra note 21, at 106, 113; Sven Steinmo, Social Democracy vs. Socialism: 
Goal Adaptation in Social Democratic Sweden, 16 POL. & SOC’Y 403, 430 (1988); see also 
Annika Baude, Public Policy and Changing Family Patterns in Sweden 1930-1977, in 
SEX ROLES & SOC. POL’Y 145, 154-55 (Jean Lipman-Blumen & Jessie Bernard, eds. 1979). 
 35. See Irene Dingledey, International Comparison of Tax Systems and Their 
Impact on the Work-Family Balancing, http://iat-info.iatge.de/aktuell/veroeff/am/dingel00b.pdf. 
 36. See Eduards, supra note 34; Ellingsæter, supra note 34, at 66; Steinmo, supra 
note 34. 
 37. Baude, supra note 34, at 171. 
 38. Nozari, supra note 33, at 221. 
 39. Id. 
 40. The old law required that men be twenty-one years old and women be eighteen 
before marrying.  Id. 




Divorce also became easy, and unilateral.  In effect, this 1973 law held 
that the community or state no longer had significant interests in the 
preservation of a marriage.  Fault would no longer be considered, nor 
would marital misconduct have any bearing on the division of 
property.41  These two changes ripped both adultery and fidelity out of 
marriage’s institutional construct.  If both husband and wife agreed to 
the divorce, it would be immediately granted.  If one spouse objected or 
if there was at least one child under age sixteen in the home, the new law 
fixed a mandatory reconsideration period of six months.42  Separation no 
longer had legal status.  Also eliminated were any legal recognition of 
betrothal and annulment.  The measure assumed adult self-support and 
largely ended the concept of alimony, except in limited cases where 
“maintenance” payments for a set time might be required.43 
VI.  THE PALME ERA 
In 1972, a new Social Democratic prime minister came to power, Olof 
Palme.  Alva Myrdal joined his cabinet as minister of disarmament and 
church affairs.  Under her open influence, Palme addressed the women 
of the Party that year, declaring an end to the era of the socialist 
housewife.  “In this [new] society,” he said, “it is only natural for both 
parents to work.  In this society it is self-evident that man and woman 
should take the same responsibility for the care of the home and the 
children . . . .”  He added that “[i]n this society . . . the care of these future 
generations is just as naturally the responsibility of us all.”44 
A true revolution in family structure commenced.  The Social 
Democratic Party abolished its Women’s League, long the bastion of the 
housewives.  New policies made employment nearly mandatory for all 
women in their twenties and thirties.  Surviving homemakers would pay 
dearly through heightened marginal taxes on their husbands.  Small 
children now moved massively into government provided daycare: 
460,000 held places in 1995, compared to only 23,000 three decades 
earlier.45 
Hirdman correctly gauges the sweep of change here, and the way in 
which the socialist vision of the Myrdals from the 1930s now took full 
form.  She notes that women’s work in this new Swedish order had a 
 41. Id. at 222. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. at 223; Michael Bogdan & Eva Ryrstedt, Marriage in Swedish Family 
Law and Swedish Conflicts of Law, 29 FAM. L.Q. 675, 677 (1995). 
 44. Hirdman, supra note 25, at 6. 
 45. Anita Nyberg, From Foster Mothers to Child Care Centers: A History of 
Working Mothers and Child Care in Sweden, 6 FEMINIST ECON. 5, 16 (2000). 
CARLSON.DOC 6/5/2007  1:54:47 PM 
[VOL. 44:  153, 2007]  Deconstruction of Marriage 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 165 
 
peculiar quality.  In the fields of agriculture and forestry, the number of 
working women actually declined, while in private industry it grew only 
modestly.  However, in the service sector (primarily governmental in 
Sweden), the number of working women rose from 268,000 in 1950 to 
819,000 by 1990; in the exclusively governmental education and health 
care sectors, the number of working women rose nearly threefold, from 
282,000 in 1950 to slightly over one million by 1990.46  In a nation of 
only eight million people, these were large changes.  In short, “family 
politics” had been used as a lever to achieve something “truly revolutionary”: 
the shriveling of private homes resting on marriage and a massive 
expansion of the state sector as a means of socializing remaining family 
functions and securing “economic democracy.”47  Pointing specifically to the 
experience of Alva Myrdal, Hirdman adds triumphantly: 
New ideas of gender replaced old-fashioned ideas about the couple.  We witness 
[here] the birth of the androgynous individual (and I speak about the explicit 
ideal) and the death of the provider and his housewife.  We thus witness old 
ideas popping up, ideas that had been buried for decades—but ideas that very 
quickly found their advocates and became developed: people, men and women, 
eager to speak the new tongue of gender.48 
VII.  THE 1987 LAWS 
Sweden’s Parliament largely codified this social revolution in two 
1987 laws.  Focused on property and inheritance questions, the new 
Marriage Code further weakened the concept of marriage as an economic 
partnership.  On the one hand, and despite pressure for a more individualistic 
formulation, the new law retained the concept of “deferred community 
property” found in the original 1920 Family Code.49  In principle, a 
spouse remained entitled to a half share in marital property at the time of 
divorce or death.  The Courts gained more power to set aside prenuptial 
contracts establishing separate property.50  And surviving spouses won 
greater control over marital property relative to children and other heirs, 
representing the “amputation of the blood line” in Sweden, another 
deliberate severing of children’s economic bonds to their parents.51 
 46. Hirdman, supra note 25, at 10. 
 47. Id. at 9. 
 48. Id. at 10. 
 49. Bradley, supra note 31, at 374, 381-82. 
 50. Id. at 382. 
 51. Id. at 384. 




On the other hand, additional provisions gave spouses increased 
independence.  One abolished the obligation each had to manage and 
preserve marital property.52  Joint liability for debts acquired by household 
expenditures or children’s education disappeared.53  In one commentator’s 
words, the new Code reflected “the increasing focus in the law itself on 
termination of marriage, rather than on its preservation.”54  The 1987 
Code also ended the husband’s special responsibility to support the 
family.55 
The Parliament also approved The Joint Homes Act in 1987.  This 
new measure governing “relationships similar to marriage”rested on “the 
principle of neutrality toward family form.”56  As legal analyst Ulla Björnberg 
explains: 
The principle states that individuals are free to develop their personal lives at 
their own will, to choose a living arrangement and to determine the ethical 
norms for their family life.  The role of family law is restricted to providing 
solutions to practical problems and to formulate rules of a kind that can be 
accepted by almost all individuals.57 
Still, the Joint Homes Act did not quite equate cohabitation with marriage.  
Specifically, cohabiters did not gain the equivalence of marital property 
rights in inheritance or the limited right to claim “maintenance” after 
separation.58  Rather, the rules in this measure applied only to the equal 
splitting of a dwelling and household goods acquired for joint use. 
Still, the measure affirmed that parenthood in consensual unions 
would involve rights and responsibilities equal to those in marriage.  
Unmarried fathers must register with the state, just as married fathers.59  
Joint custody of children after separation would be the assumption for 
both cohabitating and married couples.  A novel development in the 
1987 measure, though, was that it applied to both unmarried heterosexual 
and homosexual couples.60  Attracting little attention at the time, it 
should be noted that the latter innovation came near the end of the 
marital deconstruction project, not at its beginning. 
 52. Id. at 383. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (emphasis added). 
 55. See Nozari, supra note 33, at 220.  See generally Ake Saldeen, Sweden: 
Reforms of Marriage, Inheritance and Cohabitation Proposed, 26 J. FAM. L. 197 (1987) 
(commenting on the 1987 Code prior to its final enactment). 
 56. Ulla Björnberg, Cohabitation and Marriage in Sweden—Does Family Form 
Matter?, 15 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 350, 352-53 (2001). 
 57. Id. at 353 (emphasis added). 
 58. See id. 
 59. Id. at 354. 
 60. Bogdan & Ryrstedt, supra note 43, at 677. 
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In 1995, the Swedish Parliament expanded on this change and approved a 
measure granting same-sex couples the right to form a “registered 
partnership.”61  This represented a civil contract providing rights and 
responsibilities nearly identical to those of conventional marriage.62  
The few exceptions involved adoption, joint custody, and artificial 
insemination.63 
In 2000, the government severed its official ties to the (Lutheran) 
Church of Sweden.  This brought a symbolic end to “Christian Sweden,” 
although the country had been effectively de-Christianized some decades 
earlier.  The same year, the Swedish government extended the registered 
partnership option to foreign nationals residing in Sweden for at least 
two years.  In 2003, gay and lesbian couples gained the right to adopt 
children.  Recent Swedish Court decisions have also given legal 
recognition to polygamous marriages among immigrants from Muslim 
countries.  An association of informal Swedish polygamists predicts full 
recognition of plural marriages and other polyamorous relations in their 
land by 2010.64 
VIII.  CONTEMPORARY NUMBERS 
Since “registered partnerships” in Sweden were introduced in 1995, 
the annual number of new registered partnerships has varied between 
250 and 665, with the highest figure occurring in the first year: 




 61. See, e.g., Marianne DelPo Kulow, Same Sex Marriage: A Scandinavian 
Perspective, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 419, 438 (2002). 
 62. Kees Waaldijk, Others May Follow: The Introduction of Marriage, Quasi-
Marriage, and Semi-Marriage for Same-Sex Couples in European Countries, 38 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 569, 586 (2004). 
 63. Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella & Emily Reid, The Changing Shape of the 
“European Family” and Fundamental Rights, 27 EUR. L. REV. 80, 81 (2002). 
 64. STANISLAW KRÓLEWIEC & KARL-GÖRAN BOTTWYK, POLYGAMY IN SCANDINAVIA 
(2000), http://web.archive.org/web/20050215055552/www.nccg.org/fecpp/sweden.html. 
CARLSON.DOC 6/5/2007  1:54:47 PM 
 
168 
    New Registered Dissolved New  
Year  Partnerships Partnerships Marriages Divorces 
1995 665 0   33,642 22,528 
1996 319 0 33,784 21,377 
1997 262 0 32,313 21,009 
1998 250 6 31,598 20,761 
1999 287 80 35,628 21,000 
2000 357 101 39,895 21,502 
2001 381 105 35,778 21,022 
2002 422  92 38,012 21,322 
2003 497 113 39,041 21,130 
2004 567 115 43,088 20,106 
2005 593 134 44,381 20,000 
 
As of 2005, a total of 3700 Swedish men and women lived together as 
registered partners.  Early in this period, the number of conventional 
marriages in Sweden was falling toward a low of 31,600 in 1998.  
However, that number soon began to climb again, reaching 44,381 in 
2005, forty percent above the low point. 
Adoption by same-sex couples has also turned out to be, at least in 
practice, mostly a non-issue.  While made legal in February 2003, no 
such adoptions occurred that year, and only a handful have occurred since.  
Part of the reason is that domestic adoption in Sweden is comparatively 
uncommon.  In addition, few source countries engaging in international 
adoptions will allow the process for same-sex couples.  Moreover, the 
contemporary Swedish welfare state delivers generous benefits to all 
children, regardless of their formal legal status relative to adults.  Just as 
a flexible cohabitation by adults has become the social norm, so has the 
flexible “cohabitation” of an adult and a child not biologically related.65 
These numbers do qualify claims that the recognition of same-sex 
partnerships has damaged marriage in Sweden.  The dismantling of the 
institution had already largely occurred.  As early as 1938, the public 
linkage of marriage to procreation and sexuality was formally severed.66  
Tax reform in 1971 ended recognition of the economic unity of the 
married couple.67  Reform of marriage law in 1973 eliminated the 
contractual nature of marriage; easy entry and unilateral exit became the 
new guides.68  Subsequent reforms in 1987 and 1995 removed most 
 
 65. Kalina Tallberg-Lindahl, Memorandum prepared by The Research Service of 
Sweden’s Parliament, Homosexuella Adoptivföräldrar (2006) (on file with author). 
 66. See supra text accompanying note 18. 
 67. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37. 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 38-43. 
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remaining distinctions between marriage and other forms of intimate 
friendship.  The “thing” that is now called marriage legally carries little 
more than a symbolic label. 
As this paper has argued, such a result was the intentional product of 
successful ideological action.  As launched by the Myrdals seventy-five 
years ago, the strategy was to achieve a socialist society through the 
revolutionary transformation of private life, rather than through the 
hitherto conventional socialist method of state ownership of the means 
of production.  Marriage and private life would be deconstructed, to be 
replaced by the universal dependency of all adults and children on the 
central state.  Women, men, and children alike would be separated from 
each other and from their homes for the better part of the day.  The tasks 
of the housewife (child care, basic health care, early education, food 
preparation, elder care, cleaning) and of the breadwinner (economic 
support for a woman and her children) would be socialized, with the 
same women now paid to perform their traditional tasks as state 
specialists, using industrial techniques.  Same-sex partnerships and adoption 
were, in some respects, afterthoughts to this much larger social 
reconstruction project. 
In January 2005, the current Social Democratic government in 
Sweden appointed a sole Commissioner, Hans Regner, to study and 
make recommendations on extending “marriage” to same-sex couples.  
He works with two “reference groups,” one composed of religious 
leaders and the other of parliamentarians.  The Commissioner will also 
consider whether legal marriage should be made a strictly civil matter, or 
continue to embrace religious ceremonies.  His report is due by March 
30, 2007.69  A coalition opposed to these changes, Bevara Äktenskapet 
(“Defend Marriage”), has formed, backed by an array of religious and 
civic leaders, among them author Jan Myrdal, the controversial son of 
Alva and Gunnar.70 
 69. Justitiedepartementet, Äktenskaps—och Partnerskapsutredningen (2005:03). 
 70. See Bevara Äktenskapet, http://www.bevaraaktenskapet.se/sida.asp?p=959086034 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2007). 




IX.  CONCLUSION 
Was the introduction of registered partnerships in Sweden in 1995 
merely a neutral event?  The answer really depends on how one 
understands, or defines, marriage.  If marriage is simply a label about 
intimate relationships, without meaningful historical roots, holding no 
intrinsic nature, and endlessly variable as an expression of a current 
culture, then registered partnerships have been—and same-sex marriage 
would be—just another innovation accommodating new adult desires 
and realities. 
However, if marriage has an intrinsic structure rooted in nature;71 if 
marriage is more than a sexual relationship between two people, one also 
involving rings of obligation toward children (potential and actual), 
extended family, neighborhood, community, and nation; if marriage 
exists “only when the economic and the sexual are united into one 
relationship . . . “;72 if marriage has always had a close (if never quite 
perfect) bond with procreation and the perpetuation of the human 
species; and if marriage has a necessary role to play as a guarantor of 
liberty, as “the only . . . institution that is at once necessary and 
voluntary,” as “the only check on the state that is bound to renew itself 
as eternally as the state, and more naturally than the state,”73 then the 
answer changes.74 
In this view, marriage and family law exists to encourage, sustain, and 
protect this unique institution.  Marriage is for the propagation of 
children and for their conservation through nurture, education, and 
protection.  These tasks, in turn, renew extended families, communities, 
and nations.  Autonomous homes so formed also serve as a bulwark of 
liberty, a natural rival to the growth of the state.  As with the elimination 
of “fault” from divorce proceedings or like the deliberate dismantling of 
economic bonds between husband and wife, the introduction of registered 
partnerships or same-sex marriage further confuses and diminishes a 
vital human institution. 
The real debate is over the nature of marriage, and of society.  The 
first model noted above emphasizes variability and change.  The second 
model sees marriage as an institution, universal in its basics.  For 
consistent ideological reasons, Sweden’s socialists openly embraced the 
first model, because conventional marriage stood in the way of their 
 71. See C. Owen Lovejoy, The Origin of Man, 211 SCIENCE 341, 348 (1981). 
 72. GEORGE PETER MURDOCK, SOCIAL STRUCTURE 1-8 (1949). 
 73. G. K. CHESTERTON, The Superstition of Divorce, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
G.K. CHESTERTON IV 227, 256 (1987). 
 74. See generally ALLAN CARLSON, CONJUGAL AMERICA 5-78 (2007). 
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collectivist ambitions.  Marriage embodied a rival set of loyalties that 
prevented emergence of the desired androgynous individual dependent 
on the central state and forestalled the socialization of private life. 
Until recently, American debate over the meaning of marriage has 
been much more muddled than the one in Sweden.  One positive result 
of the current U.S. controversy over same-sex marriage has been to clear 
the air, to reveal the real issues involved, and to clarify the predictable 
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